Interview: Martin Baily by Aaron Steelman
RF: What are the principal reasons for the rise in wage
inequality in the United States over the past 30 years?
How important does skill-biased technical change 
figure into this story?  
Baily: Most economists would argue that skill-biased 
technical change is the most important factor, and I agree
with that. The liberalization of trade has had some effect as
well. The trouble with attributing wage trends to technical
change is that this is a residual explanation. The inference
comes from looking at shifts in supply and demand curves,
but to interpret those shifts, you need to look deeper.
One of the things that has happened is that wages used
to be determined institutionally but that is much less true
today. Unions were much more important than they are
now. Corporations had fairly standard compensation sched-
ules for their mid-level employees. And even at the upper
levels, the salaries of a CEO or CFO were largely deter-
mined by historical patterns. Over the last 20 years, we have
had a much more competitive economy, in all regards. This
has led companies to change the way they determine 
compensation for their employees. Instead of setting wages
by institutional means, companies are really fighting for 
talented people, and this has driven up their salaries quite
dramatically. At the same time, the share of the population
that is in manufacturing has declined, and even those who
still work in that sector tend to command relatively lower
wages. In today’s economy, much of the returns from 
economic growth goes to people with special skills or 
higher levels of education.





























Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s 
conversation with Martin Baily. For the full interview, 
go to our Web site: www.richmondfed.org/publications
Martin Baily’s career has spanned a number of fields,
from academia to government to business 
consulting. His research interests have been equally
varied, resulting in important contributions to 
a variety of topics in macroeconomics.
Anative of England, Baily has written recently about
how Europe could reform its economy in a way that
would yield faster economic growth while retaining
many aspects of its generous social safety net. He 
has also investigated the link between information 
technology investment and productivity improve-
ments, and the causes of increasing income 
inequality in the United States and abroad.
Baily has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Yale University, and the University of
Maryland; been a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution; and was a principal at McKinsey &
Company’s Global Institute. During the Clinton 
administration, he served as a member and then 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).
Since leaving the CEAin 2001, Baily has been a 
senior fellow at the Institute of International
Economics in Washington, D.C., where Aaron
Steelman interviewed him on Aug. 8, 2006.
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at the very top of the distribution — say, the top 
1 percent and above — is very sharp. Can the skill-
biased technical change story explain that phenomenon
or is there something else that has led to the spike at 
the very top?  
Baily: It depends on how you define skill-biased technical
change. The growth you have described certainly cannot be
explained by returns to education, though that certainly plays
a big role when you look at income growth across the popula-
tion as a whole. Certain skills are valued very highly in today’s
economy, and the people who possess those skills are doing
very well. I sit on the board of a small company and it is very
difficult yet very important to find a really strong CEO and
others in top management positions. We are in an extremely
competitive environment, much more so than 20 years ago,
and it has become essential to find the best people available.
RF: How does the pattern of wage inequality in Europe 
compare to that in the United States? Have some of 
continental Europe’s social and labor policies had the
effect of keeping the gap from widening as much as in
the United States? 
Baily: The wage distribution in Europe is much more com-
pressed than it is in the United States. The one exception is
the United Kingdom (UK), which looks more like the
United States than the rest of Europe. The question is why?
In continental Europe, wages are largely still set according
to long-standing institutional agreements. Unions are much
more important, and even in countries where the share of
the work force that is unionized is fairly low, like France, it’s
still the case that union-determined wage scales are widely
used. Also, in many countries you have either a relatively
high minimum wage or you have social welfare programs,
which means that people are not willing to work for the type
of wages you see in other parts of the world, so that effec-
tively creates a wage floor. And at the CEO level, you just
don’t have the type of open market that you do in the United
States. All of this leads to a much more compressed distri-
bution of wages.
Some of this is changing. There is a real concern that the
European economy is not sufficiently dynamic. But the type
of inequality that you see in the United States is viewed very
unfavorably, so it’s not clear whether, politically and socially,
Europe will be willing to make significant changes to its
labor market policies.
RF: Why do you think views toward egalitarianism 
in Europe differ so much from those in the United States?
Baily: Well, that is certainly one of the classic questions in
social science and I don’t claim to be an expert on the issue.
But the tradition of the United States as an immigrant 
country where the immigrants from Europe, especially,
came to get away from the more structured societies in
which they were born — that, I think, still has an important
legacy. I grew up in England but I have been here a very long
time, and during that period I have seen significant changes
in the UK. In fact, it is now lumped together with the
United States as part of a broader Anglo-Saxon political and
economic culture. You now have the high-priced CEOs and
lawyers in London like you do in New York and other 
financial centers in the United States. This is a big change.
England was traditionally one of the most rigidly class-based
cultures in Europe, but economic mobility has increased a
lot, as companies have gone after the most skilled employees
they can find regardless of their social backgrounds. So I
don’t think social mores are set in stone — they do evolve
over time — but there are still significant differences
between the United States and Europe.
There is an emerging literature among economists that
looks at long-standing social institutions and beliefs and how
they have affected economic development. It’s a very inter-
esting body of work. I don’t agree with all of it, of course. I
think some papers have been too ambitious in trying to
explain a country’s evolution based on a few specific traits or
events. But there is no doubt that social and cultural factors
affect institutions, which then affect economic performance.
RF: In  Transforming the European Economy and other
publications, you have argued that many countries need
to enact a series of reforms if they wish to grow more
quickly. Could you please talk about the type of reforms
you have in mind? Which ones are most important? And
which ones might be the most difficult to implement? 
Baily: I have been involved with the McKinsey Global
Institute, working on a number of studies in which we try to
understand why there are differences in productivity across
countries. The one thing that comes across most clearly is
that competitive intensity — particularly being forced to
compete against world best practices — drives industries 
to achieve higher rates of productivity. I don’t want to 
present our results as saying we should get rid of all 
regulation because we don’t say that. But it has often been
the case that regulation gets co-opted by an industry in
order to restrict competition, so you need to be careful
about how regulations are implemented and whether they
are achieving their desired end. 
It’s important to understand what we mean by competi-
tion. Simply having a lot of companies in a market does 
not mean that the market is particularly competitive.
Instead, what you might have are fragmented industries that
have not consolidated and not invested in the most modern
technology or implemented other desirable changes. So you
might have a lot of banks or retail stores, for instance, but
they are not operating at best practice because you have 
not allowed the industry to evolve. 
Where regulation has been changed in a way that encour-
ages competition, though, you have seen a lot of success. 
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Germany and France — a relatively new industry that didn’t
have a long legacy of regulation — it has achieved very high
rates of productivity, at times even higher than in the United
States. We also did a recent study of Sweden that looked at
which industries had been deregulated since Sweden joined
the European Union in 1995 and were forced to face up to
Europe-wide competition. We found that productivity
growth generally has been very good. The one domestic
industry that has not seen much improvement is construc-
tion, which is still subject to a great deal of regulation with
very strong union rules. 
So overall, the news is good. If you do the right things —
not necessarily by abolishing regulation but by changing it in
a way that is competition-enhancing
— then you will see productivity
growth in Europe.
In addition to reforming business
regulation, there is the question of
Europe’s social welfare policies.
Here we see that opposition to
change is pretty strong. Europeans
would rather sacrifice some level of 
economic efficiency for greater 
protection against poverty and 
hardship. That’s their choice. But
you could provide those social 
protections in a way that is much
more market-friendly. For instance, 
if you were to have wage insurance
rather than permitting people to
draw unemployment insurance for a
long time, then you could encourage
people to go and get another job
rather than stay out of the labor 
market altogether. I’m sympathetic
to someone who is 55 years old and is
suddenly laid off from a well-paying
job in the automobile industry, for
instance. But you just can’t function
by having everyone on social welfare.
It pushes up the tax burden too high
and it blunts the incentive to work. 
My co-author of Transforming the
European Economy is Danish. The
Danes have not implemented a per-
fect system but it does a reasonably
good job of providing social support
while also providing incentives for
people to find a job and go to work. They don’t have the
option of simply saying, “no thanks.” That’s a big difference
between Denmark and Germany. Germany ostensibly has
rules that are designed to get people back into the work force,
but if you go to Germany and ask them how many people have
been forced off the unemployment benefit rolls, the answer
is not very many. So, in practice, it doesn’t work very well.
You also need more flexibility in Europe’s labor market.
We think that companies should be allowed to more easily
implement layoff programs, with severance packages. The
French system is horrendous, where the legal system gets
involved almost every time a company wants to restructure.
RF: It seems that the transition to more liberal labor
policies in the United Kingdom has, on balance, 
benefited the UK economy. But they were won under
quite difficult circumstances. Do such reforms — in 
liberal democracies, at least — require almost a crisis 
to occur, such as the malaise that the UK economy
found itself in during the late 1970s, in order to be
implemented? Also, how important is it to have a 
persistent and charismatic figure,
such as Margaret Thatcher, 
leading the government?  
Baily: In England there were so
many entrenched interest groups
and so much conflict in the labor
market that having someone who
was willing to be tough was helpful.
But other countries have been able
to enact reforms without a figure
comparable to Mrs. Thatcher.
Significant labor market reforms
were enacted in the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Denmark. Now it’s 
true that those countries’
economies were approaching crisis
levels, with high unemployment and
a lot of people on social support
programs, which caused budget
problems. Indeed, growing fiscal
imbalances have probably been one
of the main drivers of reforms in
Europe. So I think it’s often a mix-
ture of having strong political
leaders combined with declining
economic performance that leads 
to reform. 
My colleague Adam Posen is 
writing a book on Germany and 
he disagrees, arguing that it’s 
actually easier to enact reform if 
the economy is doing well. When
people have jobs and the economy 
is expanding, people are more will-
ing to tolerate changes that they might have otherwise
found more painful. I understand that argument, but my
own view is that the experiences from the UK and the
Netherlands are strong counterexamples. The reforms
those countries achieved were easier to make because their
economies were in crisis and it was clear that something
had to be done.
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low birth rate in some European coun-
tries have for social policy, especially
programs aimed at helping the aged? 
Baily: First, I would like to point out that
the birth rate among females of European
origin in the United States is 
relatively low as well, so there is a common
pattern between the two regions. The
overall U.S. birth rate figures are much
higher than in Europe because many
recent immigrant groups are boosting the
rate. And, of course, immigration is itself
boosting the U.S. population. What are
the implications for Europe? The low
birth rate means that a growing share of
the population will be of retirement age
and labor forces will be flat or declining.
This could produce an unstable equilibri-
um. As the percentage of people receiving government
retirement funds increases, that means increasing taxes on
those who are still working, which could lead some people to
leave the labor market. That’s not a forecast — it’s more of a
warning parable. 
So Europe has to look closely at this issue and the sooner
you do something about it — by changing the incentives for
people who are already working to stay in the labor force
longer and those who are out of the labor force now to
acquire jobs — the better off you will be. The shifting 
worker-retiree ratio is not tenable. It’s going to be too costly
to fund the public pension programs as well as the health
care programs. The same is true, to some extent, in the
United States, especially with health care.
RF: How important has investment in information
technology (IT) products been to the surge in produc-
tivity that we have seen since the mid-1990s? And if 
IT was significant, why didn’t we see productivity gains
earlier? Companies were investing in ITthroughout the
post-1973 period, yet we saw relatively low rates of
productivity growth for more than 20 years. 
Baily: If you think that IT investment has been important
to the growth in productivity, and I believe it has been, 
then the simple answer to your question is that the level of
investment in IT was pretty small relative to the size of the
overall economy during the early part of this period. Also, it
took quite awhile for a lot of computer software to become
user-friendly enough so that a broad range of employees
could use it effectively. Plus, in the 1990s you had parallel
development in communications technology, which made 
a lot of ITproducts more useful. 
Looking at things more recently, we have seen a real
slump in ITinvestment. Yet productivity continued to grow
fairly rapidly. So the link between IT investment and the
rapid overall productivity growth that we
witnessed earlier has subsequently 
broken down. What we have learned is
that productivity depends on companies
improving their business processes, and
while IT can be an important facilitator
of doing things more efficiently, it isn’t
always the case. A lot of investments in
IT didn’t pay off in the way that compa-
nies had hoped. For example, a lot of
banks and hotels and other firms invest-
ed in Customer Relations Management
(CRM) software. Many of them reported
that it didn’t result in a very large payoff. 
There was a general feeling that you
had to invest in IT, and people didn’t 
really pay a lot of attention to the budget
and where they could get the most bang
for the buck. This led to some overin-
vestment. But companies now are
beginning to learn which investments were most effective
and how to make best use of the products they have. We 
are seeing another period of learning-by-doing, in the post-
2000 period.  
RF: What do you think accounts for the extreme 
enthusiasm many investors had in the late 1990s for
anything related to IT? Would you define that period as
a “bubble”? And what was it like to be in a key policy
advisory position as both the tech boom and decline
occurred? 
Baily: The very rapid rise in technology stocks was a bubble,
and the overall stock market was also in a bubble, but 
less pronounced. The prices many companies’ stocks were 
fetching could not be justified by their profits. 
Was the overall U.S. economy in a bubble? Things were
pretty good in a lot of ways over that period. There was low
unemployment, inflation was falling, and incomes were 
rising. The private sector, of course, was the biggest reason
for this prosperity. But on the policy side, I would give the
Clinton administration credit for embracing change and
being willing to stand up to interest groups that wanted 
to restrict trade and pursue other counterproductive inter-
ventions. You can certainly criticize particular measures, but
on balance, it was a very good record. One of my colleagues
said, “Bill Clinton baby-sat the U.S. economy into the 
21st century.” It was important that you had a president who
was willing to embrace that type of transition.
Now, obviously, there were some concerns. The trade
deficit was ballooning and the dollar was very high. 
I thought that if we balanced the federal budget, you could
mitigate some of those problems, because even though 
private savings were down, public savings would go from neg-
ative to positive. We did balance the budget, but the effects
on the trade deficit were not as significant as I thought they
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I don’t think it was the main reason for what happened 
to manufacturing employment, but it was certainly a con-
tributing factor. If you look at the numbers, manufacturing
employment remained relatively strong through 2000. The
downturn in the domestic economy generally was the
biggest factor in the decline in manufacturing employment.
Six years later, we still have a huge trade deficit that will
have to adjust eventually. Atrade deficit at the current level is
not sustainable over the long run. The adjustment will be
somewhat painful for the United States, because we have
been spending more than we have been producing. Just as it’s
more fun to run up a balance on your credit card than to work
it off, the adjustment of the U.S. economy to a lower deficit
and a lower level of foreign borrowing will be difficult. It will
be somewhat painful for the rest of the world too, because
they have become used to selling to the U.S. market, and they
will have to get used to generating more domestic demand. 
That said, Robert Lawrence and I have been doing some
work on this, and we are more optimistic than many others.
If the dollar does come down, so will the trade deficit — not
the energy part, but the manufacturing and services parts.
Exports will rise and imports will decline, meaning that over
a period of several years, we will be able to achieve some-
thing close to a trade balance. So while I share some of the
concerns of people like Nouriel Roubini, Ken Rogoff, and
Bob Rubin that we could experience a very painful adjust-
ment, I don’t think that is the most likely outcome. There
are too many countries with too big a stake in keeping the
U.S. economy from stumbling badly, so there would be
enough intervention to forestall a crash in the dollar. But we
could certainly see higher interest rates, which could affect
the housing market and a falling dollar could have some
inflationary effects.
RF: In addition to the policies you have already men-
tioned, what do you think were the principal economic
successes of the Clinton administration? 
Baily: Balancing the budget was a bipartisan effort, to be
sure, but I give the administration a large amount of credit
for that. And they were able to do it while still making 
significant progress in improving the resources available to
people without a lot of skills and education. Welfare reform
was also a very big achievement. NAFTA was an achieve-
ment as was getting China into the WTO. So there are many
things that I think the administration did that were good for
the long-run health of the economy.
RF: In your opinion, how ought the United States han-
dle reform of the Social Security and Medicare systems?  
Baily: The problem with Social Security is not that severe.
You could get it on track with some increases in the retire-
ment age and perhaps some modest increases in taxation.
The current gap is not that great. 
I would like to see people in the United States saving
more. So I would like to see some sort of private accounts
layered on top of Social Security. We have that in the form
of 401(k) programs, but a lot of people don’t participate.
Many people simply don’t realize the magnitude of
resources they are going to need to retire. So I favor private
accounts, not as a replacement to the existing system but as
an addition.
The obstacle to that is: If it’s compulsory, then it’s viewed
as taxation, and if it’s not compulsory, then a lot of people
will not participate. If you made the default option such that
people were automatically included in the system, then par-
ticipation rates would be pretty high and you wouldn’t have
the objection that you were imposing a new tax because 
people could opt out. The advantage of doing it through
Social Security is that you would have the government 
collecting the money and then have it invested by profes-
sionals in the private sector. This would cut down on the cost
of administering the program and it would also allow you to
restrict the range of investment vehicles that people could
choose. In general, I favor increasing consumer choice, but
some people make bad choices with their retirement invest-
ments and there’s a good case for eliminating some very
high-risk options.
Turning to Medicare, I don’t have a good answer.
Ultimately, we have to institute some form of rationing of
health care. I don’t mean that in the way that many people
perceive it. We ration all sorts of goods because we have to
make choices about how we spend our money. When we get
rid of that, by instituting a system of third-party payment,
we are no longer operating in a real market system. So we
have to decide what’s going to be the effective “limit” — I
think that it is probably a better and more accurate term
than “ration.”
Managed care is one approach to setting limits but it 
didn’t really get the chance that it needed. I understand why
people don’t like it. They want short waiting times, they
want to be able to choose the specialists they need, and so
on. Managed care put limits on those choices — it limited
health care that, at the margin, provided very little benefit
for the cost. But patient opposition to the limits was 
mobilized through the courts and with regulations.
Managed care providers relaxed the limits in response and
health care costs started rising again. 
The response today among employer-provided health
insurance plans is to increase the amount of money that the
individual patient has to pay, so that ability to pay becomes
the limiting mechanism. I don’t think that’s the best 
solution because it reduces the level of insurance and means
that some people will miss out on care that they need. But 
it is probably the mechanism that will be used to reduce the
growth of Medicare spending also. Abetter way, if it could be
achieved, is to to determine through research the treatment
protocols that  are the most cost-effective and then align the
economic incentives for patients and providers to encourage
the use of these protocols.
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RF: There was much anti-globalization talk in the
United States in the late 1990s — the protests at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle,
for instance — but, overall, that sentiment has seemed
to wane a bit. What do you think is the current state of
public opinion toward globalization, and what effect
might it have on public policy?
Baily: Globalization still is not very popular. It’s not very
popular in the United States, Europe, or the developing
world. There’s a legitimate reason for it — it brings change
and can force people to acquire new skills and change jobs.
That can be painful. People also exaggerate the effects 
of globalization. We talked earlier about skill-biased 
technical change. Even in a world without globalization,
there would still be a lot of change in many industries. 
It is easier to blame globalization than technology or 
productivity growth. Also, the United States is such a large
market that the level of competition you see in other parts
of the world through globalization still occurs here from
domestic companies alone. 
I am a fan of globalization, which is good for the 
economy. Gary Hufbauer, my colleague here at the 
Institute, estimates that it contributes a trillion dollars a
year to U.S. income. But it’s important that we do a better
job of helping the people here who do not have a lot of 
education and skills, either by having a better social safety
net or by improving access to education and job training. I
would like to see our economy made safer, in some sense, for 
globalization. And that would reduce anxiety and opposition
toward it.
RF: What do you make of the current debate on immi-
gration reform? How should the United States — and
other rich countries — address this issue?
Baily: I favor immigration. As I have stated, I am an 
immigrant myself. But there is a concern that the current
level of low-skilled immigration is putting downward 
pressure on the wages of low-skilled workers born in the
United States. It would be desirable to reduce the pace of
immigration in a way that limits the damage done to people
at the bottom end of the income distribution. How you do
that, though, can be very tricky and I can imagine reforms
that would be counterproductive.
RF: Do you favor an increase in the minimum wage?
Would expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) be a more desirable way to help low-income
Americans?
Baily: Looking at this from the standpoint of incentives, it’s
better to increase the EITC than the minimum wage
because the EITC encourages employment. The concern
about the minimum wage is that it can price some people
out of the labor market. However, given its current level, 
I would support a modest increase in the minimum wage.
It’s a blunt instrument but it helps a certain segment of the
work force, as long as it is not raised too high.
RF: Many cities have tried to pitch themselves as 
high-tech centers to potential employers and 
citizens. Are policymakers in those cities overreaching?
That is, can public policy be used to steer a local 
economy in that direction or must those changes occur
more organically?
Baily: Generally, the importance of high tech has been 
exaggerated. It is important but many people look at it as
much more of a savior than it can possibly be. There just
aren’t that many jobs in the high-tech sector, especially in
the manufacturing of high-tech products.
On the broader issue of economic geography, there are a
lot of examples of cities that have suffered large declines and
were able to come back. So it’s certainly not impossible. But
in some cases, it’s going to be very difficult to do that, and
policies aimed toward that end often will be a waste of
money. It’s similar to the way we look at certain industries.
Some are going to rise and decline over time and you ought
not try to stop that process. The same is true with cities. It’s
a mistake to try to preserve every place in the form that 
it existed decades ago. To the extent that government can
play a role here, it’s in doing a good job of providing basic
services, from public safety to education. Those things are
going to be important to any city’s well-being and ultimately
will help economic development.
RF: How would you assess the role of the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA)? What influence does it have
and which things can it do most effectively?
Baily: The role of the CEA has changed a lot over time. 
In the early 1960s, for instance, it had a lot of influence.
There were some very big questions that the executive
branch was grappling with — how to sustain economic
growth and price stability while fighting an increasingly
expensive war in Vietnam. Over time, that influence has
waxed and waned. A lot of it has to do with the president. I
served on the CEAunder President Clinton and he was very
intellectually curious. He was genuinely interested in policy
debate, and I always felt that he closely considered the
advice that we offered, whether or not he ultimately accept-
ed it.
As for what the CEA can do best, a lot of that involves
things that cannot be seen publicly. For instance, the CEAis
often asked to assess proposals coming from Congress or
other parts of the administration. Many of those proposals
would have very bad consequences, and it’s important for
the CEA to frame those issues in a way that can help foster
useful discussion among policymakers. So while the CEA
can have a public face, much of its work takes place out of
the public view.  RF
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